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Background: Charities exist to pursue a public benefit, whereas corporations serve the interests of their share-
holders. The alcohol industry uses corporate social responsibility activities to further its interests in influencing
alcohol policy. Many charities also seek to influence alcohol and other policy. The aim of this study was to explore
relationships between the alcohol industry and charities in the UK and whether these relationships may be used as
a method of influencing alcohol policy. Methods: The charity regulator websites for England and Wales and for
Scotland were the main data sources used to identify charities involved in UK alcohol policy making processes and/
or funded by the alcohol industry. Results: Five charities were identified that both receive alcohol industry funding
and are active in UK alcohol policy processes: Drinkaware; the Robertson Trust; British Institute of Innkeeping;
Mentor UK and Addaction. The latter two are the sole remaining non-industry non-governmental members of the
controversial responsibility deal alcohol network, from which all other public health interests have resigned.
Conclusion: This study raises questions about the extent to which the alcohol industry is using UK charities as
vehicles to further their own interests in UK alcohol policy. Mechanisms of industry influence in alcohol policy
making globally is an important target for further investigations designed to assist the implementation of
evidenced-based policies.
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Introduction
Alcoholic beverage producers, like all corporations, existultimately to serve the interests of their shareholders. A key
component of corporate strategy is to avoid an unfavourable
regulatory environment by influencing policy.1,2 The concentration
of the alcohol industry globally into a small number of large and
powerful alcohol corporations has increased the capacity to
influence national governments.3
The alcohol industry’s interests are not monolithic4 and are repre-
sented by a range of organizations including traditional trade bodies
and, more recently, by industry-funded ‘social aspects and public
relations organisations’ (SAPROs).5–7 SAPROs manage issues that
may be detrimental to the alcohol industry.6 The Portman Group,
for example, was established by the industry in 1989 and is well placed
in UK policy circles.8 It set up the Drinkaware website, and with the
agreement of a range of governmental agencies, constituted this as a
charity, The Drinkaware Trust, in 20069 (Supplementary ref. w1).
Justifications such as ‘corporate social responsibility’ and ‘partner-
ships with the public health community’ are used for furthering the
industry’s economic interests in policy making.5 Little attention has
been previously given to industry funding and engagement with
charities, with the exception of Drinkaware.9
The 2004 alcohol policy for England10 was strongly criticized for
not being evidence based, likely to be ineffective and dominated by
industry interests.11–13 Subsequent policy statements by the 1997–
2010 Labour Government were criticized on similar grounds.14 After
deciding in 2012 to adopt a key evidence-based policy measure,
minimum unit pricing (MUP), the current conservative-led UK
government halted its implementation in 2013,15,16 amidst
widespread speculation about alcohol industry influence
(Supplementary ref. w2).
In 2010, the newly elected UK government’s approach to public
health policy making was to work collaboratively with the alcohol
and other industries, as well as with health charities and other
organizations, within the Public Health Responsibility Deal
(PHRD; Supplementary ref. w3). Policy areas within the PHRD
include alcohol, diet and physical activity. Although excluding the
tobacco industry, the involvement of alcohol and other industries
has been heavily criticized17 and has led to a series of withdrawals of
public health interests, most recently over MUP (Supplementary refs
w4–w6).
Charities exist to pursue a public benefit and must have a
charitable purpose as defined in legislation, such as the advancement
of health.18 They are controlled by trustees (Supplementary ref. w7)
who must follow specific governance and reporting requirements.
Charities with turnover over £5000 must be registered with and
regulated by the Charity Commission.18 The website of the
Charity Commission for England & Wales contains details of all
registered charities, including the past 4-year annual report and
accounts for each registered charity with income over £25 000
(Supplementary ref. w8). Similar arrangements exist within
Scotland, although the Scottish website includes less information
about each charity. A register of charities is currently being set up
in Northern Ireland (Supplementary ref. w9).
Not for profit organizations can easily be confused with charities.
Although charities are the most common type of not for profit
organizations, many are not charities and so are not regulated by
the Charity Commission (Supplementary ref. w10). The Portman
Group (Supplementary ref. w11) and think tanks such as the
Adam Smith Institute (Supplementary ref. w12) are examples of
not for profit organizations that are not charities.
This was an exploratory study to establish what can be learnt
about the alcohol industry’s relationships with charities in light of
apparent industry influence on policy in England.19 We particularly
sought to identify evidence of funding or other associations with
charities that may suggest attempts to influence UK alcohol policy.
We used the publicly available charity regulator websites as the
primary data sources.
Methods
Data collection proceeded iteratively and was undertaken by the first
author unless otherwise indicated. The Charity Commission website
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for England and Wales (Supplementary ref. w8) was searched in
November 2013. Search terms used were ‘alcohol’, ‘addiction’,
‘drug’, ‘drugs’ and ‘dependence’ in name, charitable objects and
activities fields. This was designed to return results for charities
where alcohol was a significant part of their work, according to
charities own descriptions. Name, charitable objects and activities
are all set by the charities themselves. Charitable objects state the
purpose of the charity and form part of the registration process.
Describing charitable activities are part of the annual reporting re-
quirements. All charities with annual incomes over £10M in the
most recent annual report and accounts (includes trustees report
and audited accounts) were examined to identify income from the
alcohol industry and UK alcohol policy-related activities (see table 1
for examples). Charities with annual incomes £0.5M–£10M were
examined by the second author for involvement in alcohol policy
or industry links. Funding thresholds were designed to identify
charities with potential to be actively trying to influence UK
alcohol policy.
The charities identified through this process were further
investigated by reviewing their last 4-year annual reports and
accounts that were accessible. All trusts (typically charities who
give grants to other charities) named as donors to these charities
were investigated for alcohol links in two ways. First, the trust’s
charitable objects and activities were identified on both the
England and Wales and the Scottish charity regulator websites.
Secondly, the trust’s own website was searched. Where an alcohol
connection was found, the trust was added to the selected charities
for further investigation as described above. During this process,
other charities identified as receiving funding were selected for
further data collection from alcohol industry and other websites.
The approach was repeated for Scotland, with the following
variations due to the more limited search functionality, and the
lack of annual report and accounts registered on the Scottish site.
The Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator website (Supplementary
ref. w9) was searched for name only. Charities were identified with
income over £1M. The annual report and accounts were retrieved
from the charities own website where available and analysed. Where
the annual report and accounts were not available, the content of the
website was searched. All search results below £1M income on the
regulator website were examined by the second author as above.
Funding thresholds were lower as smaller scale may be sufficient
to seek policy influence in a less populous country with a more
open style of policy making.20
Results
The searches returned 1434 charities in England and Wales, of which
23 had incomes over £10M, and 197 incomes £0.5M–£10M, and 49
charities in Scotland of which 5 had income over £1M. The vast
majority of these charities receive local government grants for
service delivery and are not involved in alcohol policy.
Industry-funded charities active in UK policy
Five charities were identified as active in UK alcohol policy and
being alcohol industry funded (table 1). Three charities,
Drinkaware, The Robertson Trust and British Institute of
Innkeeping, receive almost all their income from the alcohol
industry or from people working in the industry (Supplementary
refs w13–w15) and have senior alcohol industry figures as trustees
(Supplementary ref. w13, w16, w17). Two other charities, Addaction
and Mentor UK receive industry funding alongside public sector
grants, and are active in alcohol policy (Supplementary ref. w18,
w19). Neither have alcohol industry figures as trustees
(Supplementary refs w20, w21).
Drinkaware is funded by donations from the alcohol industry
(Supplementary ref. w13). Previous investigations have identified
problematic aspects of the information it provides to the public
and to policy makers.9 Drinkaware is the only alcohol SAPRO that
is a charity in the UK.
The Robertson Trust is unusual in controlling The Edrington
Group, a major producer of whisky, and its income derives from
the Edrington business (Supplementary refs w32, w33). The trust
was originally formed by the Robertson family who were involved
in distilling. It is a grant awarding trust, providing funding for a
wide range of charities, including Mentor UK. The Robertson Trust
and The Edrington Group shared a Chairman, Sir Ian Good, for
more than a decade (Supplementary ref. w16). Although no evidence
was found of the Robertson Trust itself being directly active in UK
Table 1 Charities receiving alcohol industry funding and involved in UK alcohol policy
Charity Incomea Alcohol industry funding Examples of alcohol policy
involvement
Drinkaware £5.1M (Supplementary
ref. w13)
98% funding from alcohol industry, the remainder including the
sale of publications to the public sector (Supplementary
ref. w13)
Presented evidence to health select
committee on governments alcohol
strategy (Supplementary ref. w13)
The Robertson
Trust
£20.6M (Supplementary
ref. w22) Funded Mentor
UK (Supplementary
ref. w14)
Owns Edrington, maker of major whisky brands (including
Famous Grouse, Cutty Sark). Trust income derives from
Edrington’s profits (Supplementary ref. w14).
None direct found for Robertson
Trust. Edrington responded to
government consultations21
(Supplementary ref. w23)
British Institute
of Innkeeping
£4.2M (Supplementary
ref. w15)
Income from individual and corporate membership and
qualification/training fees (Supplementary ref. w15)
Responded to Home Office
consultations (Supplementary
refs w24,w25)
Addaction £46.9M (Supplementary
ref. w18)
Two projects funded by Heineken UK—£351k in 2011/12
(Supplementary ref. w18) and £80k in 2010/11 (Supplementary
ref. w26) and undisclosed amount in 2009/10 (Supplementary
ref. w27). £1M pledged by Asda (Supplementary ref. w18).
Core group member responsibility
deal alcohol network
(Supplementary ref. w28)
Mentor UK £0.4M down from £1.3M in
2011/12 (Supplementary ref
w19). Previous years £563k
in 2010/11, £688k in 2009/
10, £644k in 2008/09
(Supplementary refs
w29–w31)
CHAMPS awards (see text) funded by Diageo £30k in 2011/12
(Supplementary ref. w19) £105k in 2010/11 (Supplementary
ref. w29), £74k in 2009/10 (Supplementary ref. w30), £162k in
2008/09 (Supplementary ref. w31).
Funding from Robertson Trust £50k in 2012/13 (Supplementary
ref. w14) and Gannochy Trust in 2011/12 (Supplementary ref. w19)
Core group member responsibility
deal alcohol network
(Supplementary ref. w28)
aMost recent year available.
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alcohol policy, The Edrington Group is active in the alcohol policy
environment, for example making submissions to public consult-
ations on MUP, the content of which are very similar to other
industry submissions.21,22
The British Institute of Innkeeping is a membership organization
for the licensed retail trade, offering qualifications, education and
training to members, licensees and their staff (Supplementary ref.
w15). Corporate members include spirits producers, such as Diageo
and Bacardi Brown-Forum Brands, brewers such as Fullers
and licensed retailers such as Wetherspoons (Supplementary refs
w34, w35).
Addaction offers services to people affected by drug and alcohol
problems (Supplementary ref. w18). It received 0.7% of its income
in 2011/12 from Heineken to deliver ‘Mutual Aid Partnership’, a
peer support group programme to help recovery from alcohol
problems, and a ‘Resettlement Project’ for people leaving prison
(Supplementary ref. w18). Other activities include ‘a commission
investigating the resettlement of prisoners back into the
community with an alcohol addiction’ (Supplementary ref. w36).
Joint work between Addaction and Heineken has received wide
publicity, and is promoted as evidence of successful partnership
working (Supplementary refs w37, w38).
Mentor UK runs programmes to protect children from alcohol
and drugs through mentoring and education (Supplementary ref.
w19). In 2008/09 Mentor UK received 25% of its income from
Diageo, and continues to receive funding for CHAMPS
(Children’s Health through Alcohol Misuse Prevention), Mentor
UK’s awards for projects with children (Supplementary ref. w19).
Mentor UK received grants from both The Robertson Trust and The
Gannochy Trust (see below) (Supplementary ref. w14, w19). Mentor
UK is part of Mentor International that claims to be ‘the leading
international non-government organisation working globally to
prevent substance abuse’ (Supplementary ref. w39). Mentor
International also receives funding from the Robertson Trust
(Supplementary ref. w39).
Addaction and Mentor UK are now the sole charity representa-
tives of the PHRD alcohol network (Supplementary ref. w28). All
other charities and health bodies have withdrawn due to concerns
about alcohol industry influence (Supplementary refs w4–w6).
Both supported the introduction of MUP and were critical of
the decision not to implement it, and justified their continued
participation in the PHRD alcohol network (Supplementary refs
w40, w41). Neither Addaction nor Mentor UK have secure long-
term funding.
Other charities industry funded or active in
alcohol policy
In addition to the five charities that were both funded directly by the
alcohol industry and active in UK policy, seven other charities were
identified which were either alcohol industry funded or active in the
policy environment, but not both.
Two charities, The Diageo Foundation and The Gannochy Trust,
receive all their funding from the alcohol industry (Supplementary
refs w42, w43), but are apparently inactive in alcohol policy. The
Gannochy Trust is a Scottish grant giving trust, funded from the
profits of Bells Whisky (Supplementary ref. w43). It gives grants to
charities including Mentor UK (Supplementary ref. w19), but is not
active in UK alcohol policy.
Diageo is one of the world’s largest producers of spirits. It is the
only member of the Portman Group with its own charity. The
charitable foundation is very closely aligned with Diageo, having
trustees appointed by the Diageo Board (Supplementary ref. w44)
and all of its income of £1.5M from Diageo in 2012 (Supplementary
ref. w42). The Diageo Foundation gave 528 grants in 2012 to
charities including Reading University for scholarships (£50k) and
Cancer Research UK (£24k) (Supplementary ref. w42), but is not
active in UK alcohol policy. Diageo Great Britain, the UK subsidiary
of Diageo, directly funded Mentor UK until 2010 (Supplementary
ref. w30) rather than funding through the charitable foundation.
Diageo itself is very active in seeking to influence UK alcohol
policy (Supplementary refs w45, w46).
Harm Reduction International [also known as International
Harm Reduction Association (IHRA)] received funding from
Diageo for an alcohol in the City Project for £42k in 2010
(Supplementary ref. w47). Despite declarations in the annual
reports that it would not accept funding from the alcohol
industry, £15k in donations was declared from ‘alcohol industries’
during 2008 (Supplementary ref. w48). IHRA’s principal focus has
been on injecting drug use and HIV internationally, though they
have included work on alcohol since 2004. Policy influence
activities are at international rather than the UK level
(Supplementary ref. w49) through various collaborations with the
International Center for Alcohol Policies, the key international
SAPRO.23 These have included conferences and publications
promoting industry-favoured perspectives on alcohol policy
(Supplementary ref. w50).
Four charities, Alcohol Concern, Alcohol Focus Scotland, the
Society for the Study of Addiction (publisher of Addiction) and
Alcohol Research UK are active in UK alcohol policy or debates
(Supplementary refs w51–w54). Alcohol Concern, Alcohol Focus
Scotland and Alcohol Research UK have stated policies of not
accepting alcohol industry funds (Supplementary refs w55–w57),
though the latter has received income from Drinkaware for one
project (Supplementary ref. w54). Alcohol Concern and Alcohol
Focus Scotland have recently experienced reductions in
grant income from government funding (Supplementary refs
w52, w58).
Discussion
This study has revealed inter-relationships between the alcohol
industry and charities active in UK alcohol policy. The only two
remaining charities engaged in the PHRD alcohol network,
Addaction and Mentor UK, have accepted funding from various
alcohol industry sources. Three other charities are almost entirely
funded by the alcohol industry. Drinkaware promotes information
and education rather than evidence-based policies such as MUP,9
while British Institute of Innkeeping is an overt industry body,
drawing its membership from the industry. The Robertson Trust
owns a major spirits producer.
As the first study to use the charity regulators’ websites as the
primary data source to investigate the alcohol industry, it is
important to recognize the limitations of this study. Although
charities are required to complete annual reports and accounts
with specific reporting requirements, these do not include the
mandatory disclosure of funding sources, thus permitting confi-
dentiality for donors. The years for which we were able to cap-
ture data are necessarily limited and although we found some
disclosures of alcohol industry funding, there may well be
additional funding that is not declared, simply because it is not
required to be so.
There are other charities active in the alcohol policy arena
where alcohol is less prominent in their activities, such as
charities focussing on specific diseases including heart disease
and cancer and the Royal Colleges. These were excluded from
this study, as were smaller charities in England and Wales. This
is important to note as one recent study has identified think tanks,
some of whom are charities, are vehicles of alcohol industry
influence in the UK.24
The website of the Office of Scottish Charity Regulator has
more limited functionality than that for England and Wales,
without the ability to search charitable objects or activities, and
without posting the registered charities’ annual report
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and accounts. Many charities do not publish them online and
instead release them only when requested.
This study poses interesting questions about whether the
alcohol industry is using charities to further their own interests.
The headquarters of Addaction and Mentor UK are co-located
above a pub. Both charities have accepted alcohol industry
funding and have remained engaged in the controversial PHRD
Alcohol Network. The types of treatment and prevention work
undertaken by both organizations are unthreatening to the
economic interests of the alcohol industry. It is possible that
both these decisions reflect a core philosophy within the
charities of engagement with industry, but it is also possible
that the receipt of funding itself has influenced the decision
to remain in the PHRD. Regardless of the validity of these
candidate explanations, industry influence is a matter of obvious
concern.
Three of the five identified charities have relatively secure
income from industry: The Robertson Trust has an endowment;
Drinkaware receives income direct from the alcohol industry; and
the British Institute of Innkeeping’s income comes from both
membership fees and commercial operations. For other charities,
when income from public donations and public sector sources is
squeezed, corporate funding may become more attractive, making
them vulnerable to corporate influence. Corporations gain directly
from public relations benefits, and indirectly if the policy
influencing activities of charities are shaped by funding
(Supplementary ref. w59). It is well established that the tobacco
industry has used corporate philanthropy as a political device,25–27
though little attention internationally has previously been paid to
the alcohol industry and charities.28,29 Attention is also shifting to
other strategies used by the tobacco industry, such as subversion
of peer-reviewed science.30–32
The Robertson Trust’s control of, makes it the owner of, The
Edrington Group, and it should be considered to be part of the
alcohol industry. The relationship between The Edrington Group
and The Robertson Trust is, however, somewhat opaque; it is not
obvious how far The Robertson Trust controls the Edrington Group
or vice versa.
The charity regulator websites have proved to be a useful
research resource here. This study reveals the complex nature of
the links between the alcohol industry and charities, though un-
avoidably this picture is incomplete. Whether and to what extent
industry support for charities is an attempt to buy influence
either within the charity or within the alcohol policy-making en-
vironment needs further study. Charities operating in alcohol or
other policy arenas should be required to declare any possible
conflicts of interest from funding sources, to ensure greater trans-
parency. Such a requirement should also apply to other actors, so
that for example the economic motivations of corporate policy
influencing activities should be taken into account, alongside
claims of corporate social responsibility.
Charities core purpose is to work for and support public
benefit. Corporations are legally required to serve the interests
of their shareholders. A key component of corporate strategy is
doing what is necessary, within the law, to influence policy,
directly and indirectly and both openly and behind closed
doors.33 Unlike work on tobacco control, alcohol researchers are
largely restricted to using publicly available data sources to
attempt to gain insights into the mechanics of policy influence,
including the use of charities.34 Policy makers in the UK and
elsewhere should consider whether current levels of transparency
in policy making best serve public benefit.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at EURPUB online.
Funding
No specific funding was received for this study. Work on this article
was supported by a Wellcome Trust Research Career Development
fellowship in Basic Biomedical Science(WT086516MA) to J.M.
Conflicts of interest: S.L. was an Executive Director at Cancer
Research UK, 2004–12. Cancer Research UK received
funding from Diageo Foundation for at least 4 years up
to 2011/12 at £25k or 0.005% of income, and from
Ladbrokes in the Community Charitable Trust (unspecified
amount). Member of Responsibility Deal Steering Committee
2011/12.
Key points
 The alcohol industry funds charities that are active in UK
alcohol policy processes.
 Charities who have received alcohol industry funding are the
only remaining non-industry non-governmental members
of the controversial responsibility deal alcohol network,
from which all other public health interests have resigned.
 This study raises questions about the extent to which the
alcohol industry is using UK charities to further its own
interests.
 Policy makers in the UK and elsewhere should consider
whether current levels of transparency in policy making
best serve public benefit.
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